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Abstract 
This paper presents a review of existing theoretical perspectives and empirical work on stra-
tegic IT outsourcing. By presenting the main findings of various recent studies and elaborating on 
current research gaps it conveys a picture of the past research, the present findings and the future 
applications of IT outsourcing. Prior research has generated theoretical insights and largely qualita-
tive evidence on IT outsourcing. While quantitative studies remain sparse, limited to decision-
making and performance, there is a lack of quantitative empirical research examining outsourcing 
processes more comprehensively. This paper outlines a simple, yet integrative process model and 
develops propositions, which serve to integrate and compare theoretical strands, to evaluate existing 
empirical research and to stimulate new avenues of empirical research.  
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1. Corporate dis-aggregation and IT-outsourcing 
In his seminal works The Visible Hand (1977) and Scale and Scope (1990), Alfred Chandler 
focused on the large, vertically integrated corporation. Such corporations rose as population and 
per-capita income increased, while transportation and communication cost decreased. Today, we are 
witnessing a new division of labor among corporate clients and IT-service providers that lead to 
corporate dis-aggregation. IT outsourcing is one of the fastest growing businesses in the world. The 
IT outsourcing market, which was worth $76 billion in 1995, has reached an estimated market size 
of approximately $140 billion in 2002 (IDC, 2002). This development has been made possible 
through technological advances such as the Internet and mobile services, which change markets by 
decreasing communication costs and increasing specialization of service production. As noted by 
Langlois (2001: p. 2): “In this epoch, Smithian forces may be outpacing Chandlerian ones”. Such 
developments may also be expected to have an impact on theory building:1 Theories of corporate 
dis-aggregation highlight recent developments in IT-based service provision (see Zenger and 
Hesterly, 1997). Disciplines useful for theory development include a broad range of economic 
strands, but they also go beyond economics to social and relational theories and technology man-
agement.  
Empirical research to date has mainly relied on the transaction cost and capability tradition, 
and accordingly, has framed IT-outsourcing decisions as an issue of make-or-buy commodity ac-
tivities. By contrast, we suggest that simply framing IT outsourcing as a binary decision might be 
oversimplified at best and misleading at worst (Mahnke, 2001). For example, to outsource IT-
services requires informed buyers, codification processes, and contractual design that allow co-
development and tailoring of services in well-governed inter-firm relations. Thus, we suggest that 
IT-outsourcing research benefits from a process conceptualisation rather than focusing simply on 
outsourcing decisions, which constitute only the first phase of a successful outsourcing arrangement 
as indicated in figure one. 
 
                                                 
1 Albeit, the market for theory building may not be efficient illustrated by the focus of theories on explaining vertical 
integration, which seems at least somewhat misplaced given the apparent trends toward disintegration, downsizing, and 
refocusing (Zenger and Hesterly, 1997; Poppo and Zenger, 1998). 
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Figure 1: The IT outsourcing process 
 
 
Figure 1 serves as an illustration of the typical IT outsourcing process ranging from deci-
sions to continuous management, and performance evaluation. While such a conceptual process 
framework carries the risk of simplifying and unvarying overlaps in the process, the model is in-
tended to convey a picture of the research issues in need of empirical attention. The utility of the 
model will become evident, as it subsequently is used to organize the theoretical perspectives and 
predictions. 
In particular, two issues need to be addressed more comprehensively: First, there remains 
disagreement in the empirical literature regarding the factors that drive firms to engage in different 
types of outsourcing arrangements in alternative industry settings; and second, key determinants 
affecting the overall performance of the outsourcing process remain to be addressed empirically in 
greater depth. The current evidence of the increased interest in and relevance of IT outsourcing is 
materialized in a large number of recent works on the subject. Yet, the evidence in the literature is 
largely qualitative, while quantitative evidence is largely limited to determinants of the outsourcing 
decision. 
 What is lacking in the empirical IT outsourcing literature is a thorough review that organ-
izes and summarizes the empirical evidence, not just in terms of these two issues, but in general re-
garding all aspects of the IT outsourcing process. The article proceeds as follows: First, it provides a 
brief overview of types of IT outsourcing, the trends, and the underlying driving forces. Second, it 
examines the key theoretical frameworks deployed in empirical IT outsourcing studies and presents 
the respective main propositions of each theory in relation to IT outsourcing arrangements. Third, 
the current empirical studies are discussed in terms of their merits and flaws. Finally, the article dis-
cusses unresolved theoretical issues and empirical challenges of IT-outsourcing and offers direc-
tions for further research. 
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2. IT-Outsourcing: Types and motives 
IT outsourcing is broadly defined as a process undertaken by an organization to contract-out 
or to sell the organization’s IT assets, staff and/or activities to a third party supplier who in ex-
change provides and manages IT assets and services for monetary return over an agreed period of 
time (Kern, Willcocks and Heck, 2002). In this contractual relationship the outside vendor assumes 
responsibility of one or more IT functions, but alternative functions may require alternative proc-
esses. Scholars have used different ways of categorizing IT-outsourcing services. For example, Au-
bert, Rivard and Patry (1996) classify information system (IS) functions into system operations and 
software development, whereas Arnett and Jones (1994) deploy a more detailed categorisation em-
bodying system integration, facility management, contract programming, software support, network 
maintenance, minicomputer maintenance, mainframe maintenance, and workstation/PC mainte-
nance. Grover, Cheon and Teng (1996) divide IT outsourcing into application development and 
maintenance, system operation, networks/telecommunication management, end-user computing 
support, system planning and management, and purchase of application software. Here we suggest 
using a simpler categorization scheme based on established industry offerings, which includes in-
frastructure, applications, and business processes. A crucial issue for future research, which remains 
largely un-addressed, is how alternative types of outsourcing impact the outsourcing process in its 
entirety. 
One can also ask why firms are outsourcing the activities of their IT department at such an 
unprecedented rate when IT has never been more critical to business success. The primary reason, 
as indicated in the current literature, for why IT outsourcing has gained so widespread acceptance 
can be summed up as follows. Firms must constantly seek to lower their cost structures (Quinn, 
1992) and respond with greater flexibility (D’Aveni and Ravenscraft, 1994) to changing market 
conditions and market uncertainty in general. Moreover, all the elements of running a firm are be-
coming more competitive and complex. There is a growing pressure on management to remain effi-
cient and effective by accomplishing more with fewer resources at a faster pace. Competitive ad-
vantage also increasingly rests on value chain linkages not just from a single firm perspective but 
also from an industry-wide and even cross-industry perspective. In particular, the most common 
drivers for outsourcing IT are financial (reducing costs, obtain immediate cash, replacing capital 
outlays with periodic payments), technical (improving the quality of IT, gaining access to new 
and/or proprietary technology), strategic (focus on core activities, facilitate M&A, time to market, 
specialized firms can more easily attract highly skilled professionals that are in short supply) and 
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political motives (dissatisfaction with internal IT department, regarding IT as support function, 
pressure from vendors, desire to follow trends or imitate)2 and firms usually outsource for achieving 
a combination of these benefits (Kern, Willcocks and Heck, 2002). While all these reasons are well 
known, little evidence regarding the relative importance of these reasons across industries and out-
sourcing types exists as many empirical studies remain focused on particular sectors. 
Acknowledging all the potential benefits of outsourcing, the risks involved require attention 
in empirical research as well. These risks include loss of control, declining rate of innovation, low 
performance, high transaction costs, other hidden costs including loss of key IT employees and dis-
sipation of competitively relevant knowledge (Earl, 1996). Other risk factors include loss of absorp-
tive capacity to monitor technological advance as well as motivation loss of remaining employees 
(Mahnke, 2001). Again, despite the fact that these risks are well established in the literature, little is 
known on how input and output market conditions impact risk types and degrees across sectors and 
companies.  
 
3. Determinants of firm boundaries and the process of IT-outsourcing 
Using external sources for providing IT-services supporting production represents a change 
in the boundaries of the firm. In general, three theoretical perspectives have been invoked and tested 
to shed light on IT-outsourcing decisions: Transaction cost theory, the competence-based view and 
more recently the relational view. These theories respectively represent an economic, strategic and a 
social view on IT outsourcing.3 This section briefly presents the main constructs and theoretical im-
plications of each of the perspectives for the IT outsourcing process.  
 
3.1 Transaction cost economics 
For transaction cost scholars firms and markets are alternative governance structures that 
differ in their transaction costs (Coase, 1937). Building on Coase’s insights, Williamson has come 
to be seen as synonymous with transaction cost economics. Williamson’s cardinal question is reduc-
tion of hold up. His theory of economic organization rests on assumptions about agents’ cognition 
and identification of a transaction’s critical dimensions. Agents are regarded as bounded rational 
and opportunistic. Bounded rationality implies that agents are “intendedly rational but only limited 
                                                 
2 For a good example, see Loh and Venkatraman (1992). 
 
3 Other theorists point at additional theories such as an options perspective (Steensma and Corley, 2002), agency theory 
(Poppo and Zenger, 1998) and game theory (Kern, Willcocks and Heck, 2002). 
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so” (Simon, 1947), which results in incomplete contracts that make sequential decisions processes 
necessary. Opportunistic agents are “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1979) and con-
sequently, contracts based on promises are considered naïve and appropriate safeguards are neces-
sary.4 Firms can deal with these conditions more effectively than markets because they use rela-
tional contracts that are based on low powered incentives and are easier to audit.  The theory works 
out of the discriminating alignment hypothesis, according to which transactions, which differ in 
their attributes, are aligned with governance structures that differ in their cost and competence (Wil-
liamson, 1991). Transactions have three critical dimensions: frequency of transactions, uncertainty 
(behavioural and environmental), and the degree of asset specificity. If these assume high values 
internal governance is implicated. According to transaction cost theory, activities will be internal-
ised or outsourced depending on the relative transaction and production costs associated with IT-
services.5 Thus, by measuring transaction costs, it should be possible to provide significant guid-
ance as to whether activities should be in- or outsourced. In sum, the theory contends that as uncer-
tainty, frequency in combination with asset specificity increase so does the tendency to internalise 
the relevant IT-activity. Put another way:  IT functions are only outsourced if they do not rely on 
specific asset, are not subject to a high degree of uncertainty, and are activities, which the firm re-
lies on infrequently.6 Thus, many empirically oriented outsourcing scholars use the transaction cost 
paradigm to frame their research design. 
In addition it should be noted that some implications regarding single vs. multiple sourcing 
strategies remain to be addressed empirically. Transaction cost theory suggests that the outsourcer 
avoids small number bargaining situations, where the likelihood of vendor opportunism is increased 
(Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978). For example, if contractual costs are high in IT outsourcing 
arrangement multiple vendors may be used to control for hold up. On the other hand, transaction 
costs relevant for single vs. multiple IT-sourcing also include costs associated with searching and 
contacting a partner firm, negotiating and contracting with a partner firm, and monitoring and con-
                                                 
4 Transaction cost theory is concerned with ex ante ante well as ex post opportunism. Whereas ex ante opportunism 
most commonly derives from information asymmetries ex post opportunism or moral hazards are often connected to the 
fact that the relative bargaining situations have changed. 
 
5 Transaction cost theory assumes that market contracting is the default option for the sourcing of activities. Thus, it is 
assumed that independent sub-contractors have production cost advantages that may but need not to be offset by trans-
action costs. 
 
6 Empirical research in this view includes: Ang and Straub (1998); Aubert et al. (1996); Lacity and Willcocks (1995); 
Robertson and Gatignon (1998); Roodhooft and Warlop (1999); Wildener and Selto (1999); Steensma and Corley 
(2002). 
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trolling a partner firm over the entire outsourcing process. Indeed, such search, negotiation and 
monitoring costs play an important role in IT-outsourcing, particularly, when information asymme-
try and knowledge gaps between outsourcer and vendor are large. Thus, firms will tend to trade-off 
the increased risk of hold-up when relying on few vendors and the additional costs incurred by 
searching, contracting, and monitoring with multiple vendors (Ang and Straub 1998; Ngwenyama 
and Brynson, 1999). Indeed, an interesting issue for future empirical research is thus, how, IT-
sourcing strategies vary across market conditions in markets for alternative outsourcing types where 
knowledge gaps between IT outsourcing parties differ in degree. 
Furthermore, transaction cost theory opens possibilities for future empirical research by ac-
knowledging that any contract will inherently be incomplete.  This opens the door for vendor oppor-
tunism in case of unforeseen events that occur after contract specification. Thus, contracts should 
either be formulated at a high level of detail, or when specifications are not feasible, the contract 
should be made self-enforcing as far as possible. For example, Williamson (1983) argues that credi-
ble commitments must be build into the contract as protection against opportunism through court-
enforcement is costly if possible at all. Thus, a failure to recognise the purpose served by the eco-
nomic equivalent of hostages may be responsible for repeated errors in IT outsourcing relations. 
One way of making contracts self-enforcing is to form relational contracts i.e. informal agreements 
that are sustained by repeated reputation games (Parkhe, 1993). In this view, relational contracts 
between firms circumvent difficulties in formal contracting, but do they substitute for possible con-
tractual detail? In the transaction cost perspective, contracts may be tailored in great detail and to 
limit room for market hazards caused by opportunism and performance measuring problems (Lacity 
and Willcocks, 1998; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).7 A disadvantage of this view, however, is that con-
tractual over-specification reduces flexibility when new technological solutions become available 
and a vendor sticks to the letter rather than the spirit of a contract. Formal and highly specified con-
tracts (as prescribed by transaction cost theory) may also signal distrust and hence encourage rather 
than discourage opportunism (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). In contrast, relational contracts based on 
mutual trust may positively affect exchange performance. Moreover, they provide flexibility, which 
refers to the speed and cost of an adjustment to change in demand and supply conditions (Domber-
ger, 1998), by allowing room for dealing with future contingencies. In accordance, Sambamurthy 
and Zmud (2001) argue for flexibility as the essential element for firms’ inter-organizational IT ar-
                                                 
7 Note, however, that highly specified contracts do also open the door for opportunism if vendors stick to the word of 
the contract rather than the relational spirit.  
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rangements. Highly specified contracts may have severe limitations and relationships between out-
sourcers and vendors may be better based on mutual trust (Lee and Kim, 1999). 
Instead of regarding detailed formal contracts and relational exchanges as substitutes, they 
can also be complements (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). In this view, the outsourcing process should be 
constructed so that it allows room for dealing with contingencies in order to prevent contractual 
haggling that damages the relationship. In sum, there is a need for more empirical studies investi-
gating the issue whether relational and specific contract act as substitute or complement? 8 
 
3.2. Competence-Perspective 
The competence-based view did not originally focus on explaining firm boundaries but on 
the question of performance difference between firms (Barney, 1986; Peteraf, 1993). The perspec-
tive applies a firm’s resources and capabilities as the unit of analysis (Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 
1984). It argues that firms possess numerous capabilities, but it is the capabilities, that are unique, 
inimitable, non-substitutable and rare, which are the bases for competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991). Prahalad and Hamel (1990) use the notion of core competencies to denote combinations of 
central strategic resources and capabilities. They define core competencies as the collective learning 
in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple 
streams of technologies. Three identifying elements characterize core competencies. First, they pro-
vide access to a variety of markets. Second, they make a significant contribution to the perceived 
customers’ benefits of the end products. Third, they are difficult for competitors to imitate. Overall, 
the capability-based view purports that competitive advantage arises from developing and deploy-
ing unique, valuable and non-imitable resources. 
What are the implications of the capability-based view for outsourcing decisions? According 
to the theory, firms may only internalise sources of competitive advantage if they have more accu-
rate expectations of their future value than competitors have (Barney, 1986). Dierickx and Cool 
(1989) add that only non-tradeable assets such as a firm’s reputation, customers’ loyalty, trust and 
firm-specific labour, which need to be accumulated internally in the firm can lead to sustainable 
                                                 
8 Several empirical studies have shown a clear connection between the transaction cost theory’s constructs, specifically 
asset specificity, and the choice of governance structure. However, transaction cost scholars cannot be fully content 
with the empirical findings. It is obvious that organizations increasingly engage in small number bargaining and out-
source IT activities with high degrees of specificity in industries that TAC-studies do not cover. Thus, rather than pre-
dicting or advising internalisation, transaction cost scholars must consider how firms should deal with such problems 
given that they need to outsource due to reasons of technological developments. The approach needs to consider re-
source capabilities and internal production constrains.  
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competitive advantages. Accordingly, DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani (1998) argue that firms must 
align their IT contracts with their strategic intent and strive to strike the right balance between risks 
and rewards for both the vendor and the client. Quinn and Hilmer (1994) argue that a firm should 
concentrate its resources on a set of core competencies and strategically outsource other activities, 
including IT, when these are neither strategic critical nor rest on special capabilities. Thus, IT-
activities may be outsourced if they are not considered to be core competencies of the firm (Gilley 
and Rasheed, 2000; Steensma and Corley, 2002). Form a different angle; Steensma and Corley 
(2002) propose that if IT offers opportunity for sustained competitive advantage the firm should 
pursue an internalisation strategy. 
It should be noted, however, that a firm cannot derive competitive advantage from IT activi-
ties accessed through markets, if these are freely available to competitors.9 In this case the best a 
company may expect is to avoid competitive dis-advantage. For example, Allen and Chandrashekar 
(2000) suggest that the decision to outsource is usually based on the premise that the contractor has 
some inherent advantage over the host firm in producing and delivering a service. Nonetheless, 
even if firms use IT outsourcing to avoid competitive dis-advantage with regard to a particular IT 
activity, the firm might benefit additionally, when managerial capacity is freed and attention can be 
focussed on other value creating activities. In addition, if focusing on particular sets of activities 
increases the capacity to learn, efficiency improvements and innovation can be focussed on strategi-
cally most relevant activities to which IT-management may or may not belong. However, because 
learning leads also to absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), focussing activities too nar-
rowly may lead to learning traps (March, 1991). This, in turn, can compromise future possibilities 
of searching for and selecting capable IT suppliers as the absorptive capacity of the outsourcer di-
minishes (Mahnke, 2001).  
Recently, scholars argue that firms’ motivations for outsourcing are evolving from a primary 
focus on cost reductions to an emerging emphasis on improving business performance (e.g. Di-
Romualdo and Gurbaxani, 1998; Sambamurthy and Zmud, 2001). For example, DiRomualdo and 
Gurbaxani (1998) argue that as firms confront a wide disparity of knowledge, skills and technology 
they need and the corresponding knowledge, skills and technology they have, IT outsourcing is in-
creasingly becoming a strategic tool to assist closing capability gaps. In this regard, Baden-Fuller, 
Targett and Hunt (2000) propose that outsourcing of what seems to be core does make sense when 
the firm is threatened under four circumstances: (a) Catch-up where despite a slow moving envi-
                                                 
9 The argument disregards the opportunity of making exclusive agreements with partners. 
 10
ronment the firm has fallen behind its competitors; (b) changing value chains where the firm must 
respond to changing customer needs; (c) technology shifts under which the firm’s core is outdated 
because of new technology; and (d) in emerging markets where new markets are available to the 
firm because of rapid changes in technology and customer demand. 
 In sum, from a competence-based view the most important factors affecting outsourcing de-
cisions is securing access to critical IT resources that the firm does not have or fails to maintain on 
competitive levels – be they core or peripheral. The different arguments can be reconciled by stating 
that firms use outsourcing for establishing optimal resource/capability configurations in which the 
value of their resources is maximised relative to other possible combinations. Indeed, IT outsourc-
ing as an empirical context can also be used to assess theoretical predictions of transaction cost the-
ory and capability perspective comparatively (e.g. Poppo and Zenger, 1998, 2002). 
Simply framing the outsourcing process as a make-or buy decision as envisioned by transac-
tion cost economics and the capability perspective might be incomplete, however. Outsourcers can 
not only make and buy, they can also partner with other firms in long-term relations (Gulati, Nohria 
and Zaheer, 2000). Hence, in their search for access to various IT-resources, firms carefully select 
partners with needed resource profiles and learn by intensifying their relationship with them (Jones, 
Hesterly, Fladmoe-Lindquist and Borgatti, 1998).10 By implication, the choice of specific vendors 
and the determinant of number of vendors are based on achieving access to relevant skills, knowl-
edge and technology. The more, access and co-development of capabilities are at stake, the more 
interesting it becomes to address long term relational issues between IT outsourcer and vendor. 
 
 
3.3. Relational view 
The relational view suggests that a firm’s critical capabilities may span firm boundaries and 
may be embedded in inter-firm routines and processes (Dyer and Singh, 1998). This perspective is 
relatively new and integrates the evolving literature on strategic alliances, networks, and relation-
ship management in international marketing. It adopts the networks between firms as the unit of 
analysis and focuses on rent creation through different forms of partnerships. The relational view 
                                                 
10 It is also possible to generally argue for and against using large and small vendors. Advantages of small vendors in-
clude less staff turnover, more responsive, experts in niche areas, better communication, attach higher importance to 
individual projects. The disadvantages are that they tend to be less financially secure, lack proven track records, lack 
breath in services and international network, lack understanding of the broader picture outside the expertise are. The 
reverse arguments apply for larger vendors. 
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draws partially on the competence-based theories and partially on transaction cost reasoning with-
out being fully comprised by both. Relational rents are possible when partners combine, exchange, 
or invest in idiosyncratic assets, knowledge, and resources/capabilities and/or they employ effective 
governance mechanisms that lower transaction costs or permit the realization of rents through the 
synergistic combination of assets, knowledge, or capabilities (Dyer and Singh, 1998).  
Accordingly, activities will only be outsourced if the relationship offers rents generated 
from inter-firm knowledge sharing, complementary resource endowments or effective governance 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998). Such rent creation requires relation-specific investments and activities are 
only outsourced if these investments are likely to yield a satisfactory return for all firms involved. 
Hence, the theory does not presume that combinations of different firms’ resources will in it self 
create economic rents. Instead, only the continuous successful evolvement of the IT vendor – out-
sourcer relationship will create rents. This view conflicts somewhat with the capability perspective. 
As Takeshi (2001: p. 403) argues, “however close relations a corporation builds with its partners 
and however capable the partners are, the firm still has to compete with other firms who are seeking 
similar close relations with their capable partners. Competing firms may even share some partners. 
How could a company outperform competitors who also have cooperative relations with their part-
ners? Without addressing this question, a firm cannot gain a sustainable competitive advantage 
from outsourcing”. This statement nicely illustrates the differences between the two perspectives. 
The capability-based views sees competitive advantage arising from the remaining activities within 
the firm whereas relational scholars argue that competitive advantage is associated with the activi-
ties placed outside the firm. Perhaps, a possibility for empirical research is to ask whether alterna-
tive theoretical frameworks apply to the three alternative forms of outsourcing  (infrastructure, ap-
plication, business process) to different degrees. For example, an effective strategy from a relational 
view requires a firm to systematically share valuable knowledge with vendors in return for access to 
its partners’ knowledge bases. The necessity of knowledge sharing implies a mutual interdepend-
ence between outsourcers and vendors in order to achieve an arrangement’s potential. This might be 
more relevant for business process outsourcing as compared to infrastructure outsourcing arrange-
ments, where interfaces between components might be specified more fully (Mahnke, 2001). 
 Even in this case, several factors may inhibit such strategies, however. Culture clashes are 
one of the main reasons why relationships fail to create value in IT-outsourcing. Thus, an empirical 
cultural assessment between partners in a business process outsourcing relationship can include 
elements such as examination of corporate values, organizational structure, reward and incentive 
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systems, leadership styles, decision-making processes, work practices, corporate history, etc. (Dyer, 
Kale and Singh, 2001). Because these variables impact knowledge sharing and transfer mechanism, 
the performance of an IT outsourcing process may depend on them. Few studies investigate such 
issues empirically (see Lee and Kim, 1999, Lee, 2001 for an exception). 
Due to the resources required for effective relationship management and the continuous fo-
cus on knowledge sharing, the relational view argues that firms can increase profits by increasing 
their dependence on a smaller number of suppliers. An increased incentive of suppliers to share 
knowledge and make performance-enhancing investments in relation-specific assets becomes a re-
quirement (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1993; Dyer and Singh, 1998). Firms, in this view, may need to 
continuously ensure that they and the vendor share objectives and have a mutual understanding of 
their work processes and decisions. The requirements of a partnership management style include 
risk and benefit sharing and a view of the relationship as a win-win situation (Lee and Kim, 1999). 
In a similar vein Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle and Borza (2000) argue that successful inter-firm col-
laborations is a product of both partners achieving their goals. Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993) simi-
larly suggest, by focusing on vendor incentives, outsourcers will often maximise profits by limiting 
its options and reducing their own bargaining power. Thus, in this view, the performance of an out-
sourcing relationship is contingent on building social capital with the aim of establishing mutual 
interests and achieving mutual gains. 
To summarize: First, the capability based view and the transaction cost perspective apply 
best to identifying whether of not IT-activities are candidates for outsourcing but have little to say 
about how to move beyond the decision and the deal to the address empirical issues relevant to 
making relationship work for value creation. Second, all three perspectives offer theoretical predic-
tions and contradictions that remain to be empirically addressed. Finally, a fruitful avenue of future 
research is to address existing theory comparatively across industry settings and under alternative 
market conditions.  
 
4. The empirical literature on IT-outsourcing: Merits and flaws 
Many appealing arguments have been offered concerning outsourcing decisions and man-
agement – as argued above. But because the majority of papers discussed so far have been primarily 
theoretical in nature and have relied on mostly anecdotal evidence, it may be fair to say that schol-
ars pretend to know more theoretically, than empirical studies are able to corroborate through sound 
testing. The aim of this section is to examine empirical tests of theoretical assertions. Here, we re-
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view 19 empirical IT outsourcing studies conducted in the period 1995-2002, published in a variety 
of academic journals.  Based on this review, we conclude the following:  
 
• Empirical studies follow slowly theoretical developments 
• Focus of empirical studies remain limited to outsourcing decision making and outcome 
• Future research is needed, including a) studies addressing comparative testing of theories, b) 
studies of contractual design, and c) studies of the outsourcing process in its entirety. 
 
4.1 Empirical studies follow slowly theoretical developments 
Originally the empirical IT outsourcing literature concentrated on the IT outsourcing deci-
sion. Debate arose as to relative merits of economic, namely transaction cost, and strategic, the 
competence-based arguments, reasons for outsourcing decisions and outcomes. Later, scholars 
claimed that even though most IT outsourcing decisions were made based on economic and/or stra-
tegic analysis, they at times failed due relational factors. The reason for this may be that while out-
sourcing appears attractive at the strategic level, serious problem are often encountered in the out-
sourcing process. The emphasis on relational governance structures represents a more recent depar-
ture from the traditional organizing principles of internal production or external procurement (Sam-
bamurthy and Zmud, 2000). However, empirical research within IT outsourcing is confined largely 
to the make-or-buy decision and deals scarcely with the process determinants of IT outsourcing per-
formance. Only recently empirical studies appeared that involve managerial issues including the 
social governance of relationships and the potential for rent generation arising from knowledge 
sharing and learning (Lee and Kim, 1999; Lee, 2001). Still, they remain few in number.  
 
Table 1: Empirical Outsourcing studies 
Concepts Author(s) Data Main hypotheses or questions Results 
Transaction 
cost econom-
ics: 
Production 
cost, transac-
tion costs, 
financial slack. 
Ang & 
Straub 
(1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
243 US bank CIO or 
high-ranking employ-
ees.  
A: The higher the comparative production cost 
advantage offered through IT outsourcing, the 
greater is the degree of IT outsourcing. 
 
B: The less the transaction costs involved in 
hiring outsourcers, the greater is the degree 
outsourcing,  
 
C: The less the financial slack, the greater the 
degree of outsourcing. 
 
A: Supported 
 
B: Supported  
 
C: Not supported 
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Transaction 
cost econom-
ics: Contracts, 
adjustment 
costs, knowl-
edge- and 
data-
production, 
governance 
spillovers. 
Azoulay 
(2000) 
Data from DataEdge: 
5209 clinical studies, 
sponsored by 53 firms, 
for the development of 
925 experimental com-
pounds 
A: Outsourcing intensity responds positively 
to shocks in the level of activity for the firm as 
a whole. 
 
B: The probability that a given project is out-
sourced decreases with the relative importance 
of knowledge-production activities compared 
to data-production activities. 
 
C: At least over some range, the performance 
of internal transactions is increasing in the 
level of outsourcing intensity for the firm as a 
whole. 
 
A: Supported 
 
B: Supported 
 
C: Supported 
Transaction 
cost econom-
ics: 
Internal labour 
markets, 
HRM. 
 
 
 
 
Azoulay  
(2002) 
Qualitative: 6 pharma-
ceutical and biotechno-
logical firms, contract 
research organisations, 
and clinical trial sites. 
Quantitative: 5209 
clinical studies spon-
sored by 53 firms. Re-
spondents: 100 employ-
ees. 
A: The size of the external labour pool adjusts 
less to shocks than does the size of the internal 
labour pool, all other things equal. 
 
B: The higher the average degree of complex-
ity in a firm’s portfolio of projects, the lower 
its reliance on outsourcing, all other things 
equal.  
 
C: The productivity of internal teams is in-
creasing in the level of outsourcing intensity 
for the firm as a whole, all other things equal. 
 
A: Support but not always sig-
nificant 
 
B: Strong support 
 
C: Supported 
 
General: firms overcome em-
ployee commitment problems by 
contracting out (thus they fire 
contractors rather than employ-
ees). 
Transaction 
cost econom-
ics: 
Outsourcing 
decision. 
Fixler & 
Siegel 
(1999) 
45 service and 450 
manufacturing indus-
tries 
A: Manufacturing industries with high growth 
in wages should be most active in outsourcing 
because the attending profit (assumed to be a 
function of the wage differential) is likely to 
be quite high. 
 
B: There should be a positive correlation be-
tween manufacturing productivity and out-
sourcing (in industries with a higher labour 
share). 
 
C: There should be an observable increase in 
the output of service industries that experience 
the increased demand implied by the outsourc-
ing hypotheses. 
A: Supported 
 
B: Supported 
 
C: Supported 
 
General: Outsourcing has played 
a major role in the growth of the 
service sector and the productiv-
ity growth differential between 
manufacturing and services can 
only be assessed by acknowledg-
ing this fact. 
Transaction 
cost econom-
ics: 
Contracts, 
bounded ra-
tionality, un-
certainty, 
safeguards, 
arm’s length 
relations, 
embedded 
relations, and 
reputation. 
Kim & 
Miranda 
(2001) 
 
 
Questionnaire re-
sponded by 142 city 
government IS manag-
ers 
 
A: When a high level of bounded rationality 
exists, organizations will be less likely to rely 
on an arm’s length relationship and tend to 
rely on embedded relationships and rely on a 
provider’s reputation.  
 
B: An arm’s length contract will be negatively 
related to outsourcing expenditure, whereas an 
embedded relationship will be positively re-
lated to outsourcing expenditure. 
 
C: An arm’s length relationship will lead to an 
embedded relationship. 
 
D: An arm’s length and an embedded relation-
ship will relate positively to the provider’s 
reputation. 
 
A: Supported 
 
B: Supported 
 
C: Supported 
 
D: it was supported that an arm’s 
length relationship relates posi-
tively to the provider’s reputa-
tion but not that an embedded 
relationship does. 
 
 
Transaction 
cost econom-
ics: 
Production 
and transac-
tion costs, 
asset specific-
ity, uncer-
tainty, small 
number bar-
gaining. 
Lacity & 
Willcocks 
(1995) 
61 IT outsourcing deci-
sions made by 19 US 
and 21 UK organiza-
tions between 1991-
1995 by 145 business 
executives, CIOs, out-
sourcing consultants, 
vendor account manag-
ers. 
A: When production and transaction costs are 
considered, outsourcing is more efficient than 
insourcing for all transactions except:  
a) Recurrent idiosyncratic transac-
tions;   
b) Asset-specific transactions with a 
high degree of uncertainty; or  
c) Transactions with a small number 
of suppliers. 
A: Although transaction cost 
theory provides a logical and 
ubiquitous framework, two 
issues make it difficult to opera-
tionalise: language ambiguity 
and using the transaction as the 
unit of analysis 
 15
Transaction 
cost econom-
ics: 
Discriminating 
alignment, 
contractual 
hazards, per-
formance of 
alternative 
modes of 
governance 
 
Leiblein, 
Reuer & 
Dalsace 
(2002) 
Report of 176 global 
integrated circuit manu-
factures. 714 decisions 
involving production of 
semiconductor devises 
A: Do unobserved attributes underlying firms’ 
vertical integration decisions influence the 
governance-technological performance rela-
tionship? 
 
B: Does the fit between firms’ vertical govern-
ance decisions and relevant transactional at-
tributes highlighted by TCE influence techno-
logical performance? 
Main finding 1: Governance 
decisions per se do not signifi-
cantly influence technological 
performance.  
 
Main finding 2: Deviation from 
the optimal discriminating 
alignment may have detrimental 
effect on performance. 
Transaction 
cost econom-
ics: 
Technology 
alliances, 
innovation, 
asset specific-
ity, uncer-
tainty, meas-
urement 
Robertson 
& Ga-
tignon 
(1998) 
Mail survey of 1320 
randomly selected R&D 
directors over a broad 
spectrum of US indus-
tries. 264 questionnaires 
were returned. 
A: The greater the specificity of existing as-
sets, the more likely that the firm will develop 
technology internally rather than establish a 
technology alliance. 
 
B: The greater the demand uncertainty, the 
more likely that the firm will develop technol-
ogy internally rather than establish a technol-
ogy alliance. 
 
C: The greater the technological uncertainty, 
the more likely that the firm will establish a 
technology alliance rather than develop the 
technology internally. 
 
D: The greater the difficulty in measuring an 
innovation’s performance, the more likely that 
the firm will develop technology internally 
rather than establish a technology alliance. 
 
E: The greater the firm’s level of experience 
with successful alliances, the more likely that 
the firm will establish a technology alliance 
rather than develop the technology internally. 
 
A: Supported 
 
B: Support, but not significant 
 
C: Supported 
 
D: Supported 
 
E: Supported  
Transaction 
cost econom-
ics: 
Asset specific-
ity, sunk costs, 
psychological 
bias, manage-
rial decision 
making 
 
Rood-
hooft & 
Warlop 
(1999) 
165 managers of Bel-
gian hospitals. Half of 
test population was told 
that the decision fol-
lowed in-house produc-
tion (i.e. sunk costs) the 
other was told it con-
cerned a new activity. 
A: To which extent do sophisticated decision 
makers consider sunk costs and asset specific-
ity while choosing between internal production 
and outsourcing of a component of the firm’s 
value chain? 
The anticipation of asset specific 
investment and the presence of 
sunk costs reduced the likeli-
hood of outsourcing. 
Transaction 
cost econom-
ics: 
Asset specific-
ity, frequency, 
uncertainty 
Wildener 
& Selto 
(1999) 
Studying factors influ-
encing in or outsourcing 
internal auditing (IA). 
Quantitative and quali-
tative data from a ran-
dom sample of 600 
publicly traded firms 
with more than 500 
employees (198 re-
sponses) 
A: Firms internalise IA resources and attrib-
utes that require firm-specific investments 
(e.g. expertise, training, and knowledge) and 
support the firm’s strategy. Conversely, firms 
outsource IA resources and attributes that are 
more generally applicable. 
 
B: Firms that experience high levels of envi-
ronmental uncertainty will internalise IA. 
Conversely, firms that experience low levels 
of environmental uncertainty will outsource 
IA. 
 
C: Firms that experience high levels of behav-
ioural uncertainty will internalise IA. Con-
versely, firms that experience low levels of 
behavioural uncertainty will outsource IA. 
 
D: Firms that use IA services frequently will 
internalise IA. Conversely, firms that use IA 
services infrequently will outsource IA. 
 
A: Strongly supported 
 
B: Not supported 
 
C: Not supported 
 
D: Supported 
 
General: interaction between 
environmental and behavioural 
uncertainty and asset specificity 
to affect performance was not 
fund. 
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Resource-
based view: 
Core compe-
tence, valu-
able, rare, 
inimitable, 
non-
substitutable 
resources 
Gilley & 
Rasheed 
(2000) 
94 independent, non-
diversified manufactur-
ing firms with more 
than 50 employees. 
Respondents: Top ex-
ecutive plus one execu-
tive selected by the top 
executive. 
A: Peripheral outsourcing intensity has a posi-
tive effect on firm performance and core out-
sourcing intensity has a negative effect on firm 
performance. 
 
B: A firm’s business level strategy moderates 
the relationship between outsourcing intensity 
and performance, such that for a cost leader, 
any positive effect of outsourcing on perform-
ance is strengthened and any negative effect is 
weakened; and for a differentiator, any posi-
tive effect is weakened and any negative is 
strengthened. 
 
C: Environmental dynamism moderates the 
relationship between outsourcing intensity and 
performance such that any positive effect of 
outsourcing on firm performance is strength-
ened and any negative effect of outsourcing on 
performance is weakened as dynamism in-
creases. 
 
A: Not supported 
 
B: Partial support (findings for 
cost leaders support, finding for 
innovative differentiators is 
opposite of hypothesis 
 
C: Not supported, opposite find-
ing 
Relational 
view: 
Partnerships 
Grover, 
Cheon & 
Teng 
(1996) 
Randomly selected 
industries. Respondents: 
188 (of 1000) IS top 
executives 
A: The degree of outsourcing will be posi-
tively related to outsourcing success. 
 
B: The association between the degree of 
outsourcing and outsourcing success is moder-
ated (stronger) by the level of service quality. 
 
C: The association between the degree of 
outsourcing and outsourcing success is medi-
ated by the quality of partnership between the 
service provider and the firm. 
A: Supported 
 
B: Supported 
 
C: Generally supported 
 
General: By examining specific 
IT functions, the article find that 
transaction costs economics and 
its notion of asset specificity are 
important explanatory factors for 
IT outsourcing decisions 
 
Relational 
view: 
Partnership 
quality, out-
sourcing suc-
cess 
Kim & 
Lee 
(1999) 
Initial interviews with 7 
IS professionals, then 
questionnaires to 36 
organizations 
A: Participation, communication, information 
sharing, and top management support contrib-
ute positively to partnership quality. 
 
B: Joint action, coordination, and cultural 
similarity contribute positively to partnership 
quality. 
 
C: Age of relationship and mutual dependency 
contribute positively to partnership quality. 
 
D: There is a positive relationship between 
partnership quality and outsourcing success. 
 
A: Support for all four elements 
 
B: No support for the three 
elements 
 
C: Contradicted for both ele-
ments 
 
D: Supported! 
Relational 
view: 
Knowledge-
sharing part-
nership qual-
ity, outsourc-
ing success 
Lee 
(2001) 
195 Korean public 
sector organisations. 
Respondents: IS manag-
ers. 
A: The degree of implicit and explicit knowl-
edge sharing will have a positive effect on 
outsourcing success. 
  
B: The association between the degree of 
implicit and explicit knowledge sharing and 
outsourcing success is moderated by the level 
of organisational capability. 
 
C: The association between the degree of 
implicit and explicit knowledge sharing and 
outsourcing success is mediated by the quality 
of the partnership. 
 
A: Supported 
 
B: Supported 
 
C: Supported 
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Relational 
view and 
transaction 
cost econom-
ics 
Poppo & 
Zenger 
(2002) 
Data from IS executives 
either the senior corpo-
rate information ser-
vices manager, or the 
manager controlling 
major data-processing 
facilities in operating 
departments, divisions, 
or subsidiaries. List of 
key informants was 
obtained from Directory 
of Top Computer Ex-
ecutives. Survey mailed 
to 3000 randomly 
picked names. 181 
responses, 152 usable. 
Subsequent telephone 
survey led to a core 
sample for data of 285. 
 
A: Increases in exchange hazards encourage 
more complex contracts 
 
B: Increases in exchange hazards will lead to 
more relational governance 
 
C: Contractual complexity and relational gov-
ernance will function as substitutes in explain-
ing exchange performance. 
 
D: Contractual complexity and relational gov-
ernance will function as complements in ex-
plaining exchange performance. 
A: Supported 
 
B: Weak support 
 
C: Not supported 
 
D: Supported 
Selective 
outsourcing 
contracts  
Lacity & 
Willcocks 
(1998) 
61 IT outsourcing deci-
sions made by 19 US 
and 21 UK organiza-
tions between 1991-
1995. Respondents: 145  
(business executives, 
CIOs, outsourcing con-
sultants, vendor account 
managers) 
What are the practices that differentiate suc-
cess from failure in IT outsourcing? 
Selective outsourcing decisions 
achieved expected cost savings 
with a higher relative frequency 
than total outsourcing or in-
sourcing decisions. 
 
Senior executives and IT man-
agers who made decisions to-
gether achieved expected cost 
savings with a higher relative 
frequency than when either 
group acted alone. 
 
Organizations that invited inter-
nal and external bids achieved 
expected cost savings with a 
higher relative frequency than 
those that only compared exter-
nal bids with current IT costs. 
 
Short-term, recently signed, and 
detailed fee-for-service contracts 
achieved expected cost savings 
with a higher relative frequency 
than long-term, older, other 
types of fee-for-service con-
tracts. 
 
Outsourcing 
decision 
Smith, 
Mitra & 
Narasim-
han 
(1998) 
Key word (contract, 
facilities management, 
outsourcing) search on 
Business Index and ABI 
Inform. 29 large-scale 
companies comprised 
the sample. 
A: Firms that enter into large-scale IS out-
sourcing arrangements are more cost-
conscious (have a greater need to reduce costs) 
than other firms in their industries. 
 
B: Firms enter into large-scale IS outsourcing 
arrangements as part of an organization-wide 
effort to focus on their core competency. 
 
C: Firms that enter into large-scale IS out-
sourcing arrangements have a greater need to 
generate cash than other firms in their indus-
tries. 
 
D: Firms that outsource IS have lower profit-
ability than other firms in their industries. 
 
A: Supported 
 
B: Not supported 
 
C: Supported 
 
D: No significant support 
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Transaction 
cost econom-
ics, knowl-
edge-based 
view, agency 
theory: 
Asset specific-
ity, language, 
routines, tech-
nological 
change 
Poppo & 
Zenger 
(1998) 
Data concerning the 
performance, govern-
ance, and exchange 
characteristics of inter-
nally and externally 
sourced information 
services. Respondents: 
The senior corporate 
information services 
manager or the manager 
controlling major data-
processing facilities in 
operating departments, 
divisions, or subsidiar-
ies. List of key infor-
mants was obtained 
from Directory of Top 
Computer Executives. 
Survey mailed to 3000 
randomly picked names. 
181 responses, 152 
usable. 
 
A: Does increases in the specificity of an ac-
tivity negatively affect the performance of 
governance through the market, positively 
affect the performance of governance through 
firm organization, or will they have similar 
effects on firm and market governance so that 
such increases are unrelated to the choice of 
boundary? 
 
B: Does increased difficulty in measuring the 
performance of an activity negatively affect 
the performance of exchanges governed 
through the market, negatively affect the per-
formance of exchanges governed through firm 
organization or will it have similar effects on 
market and firm performance so that changes 
in measurement are unrelated to the choice of 
boundary? 
 
C: Does increased technological uncertainty 
will negatively affect market performance or 
negatively affect firm performance. 
 
The decision to vertically inte-
grate when information services 
are firm specific hinges on per-
formance losses that arise or 
would arise from using market 
governance, rather than internal 
governance efficiency increasing 
with firm specific investments! 
 
Overall, the results provide 
strong support for TCE argu-
ments: increasing asset specific-
ity leads to the diminishing 
effectiveness of market govern-
ance. The results fail to support 
KBV arguments. The reason is 
that when underlying techno-
logical change is rapid, routines, 
language and other forms of 
knowledge become rigidities. In 
addition, the results clearly show 
that boundary choices do matter! 
Transaction 
cost econom-
ics, resource-
based view, 
and an options 
perspective. 
Testing not 
which theory 
is correct, but 
when each 
theory applies. 
Steensma 
& Corley 
(2002) 
280 questionnaires of 
which 123 was usable. 
Respondents: Two 
executives: usually 
CEO/president and 
director of 
R&D/technology 
A: There is a positive relationship between the 
perceived threat of opportunism and the prob-
ability that a firm will source technology 
through acquisition as opposed to licensing. 
 
B: There is a negative relationship between the 
perceived threat of commercial failure and the 
probability that a firm will source technology 
through acquisition as opposed to licensing. 
 
C: There is a positive relationship between the 
perceived opportunity for sustainable advan-
tage and the probability that a firm will source 
technology with an acquisition as opposed to 
licensing. 
 
D: Low management stockholdings will make 
the positive relationship in proposition A and 
the negative relationship in proposition B 
stronger, whereas high management stock-
holdings will make the positive relationship in 
proposition C stronger. 
 
E: Risk averseness makes the positive relation-
ship in proposition A and the negative rela-
tionship in proposition B stronger, whereas 
risk-seeking behaviour will make the positive 
relationship in proposition C stronger. 
 
Transaction cost rational, based 
on the threat of opportunism, 
better explains firm boundaries 
when management stockhold-
ings are low than when they are 
high. 
 
Transaction cost rational, based 
on the threat of opportunism, 
better explains firm boundaries 
when slack resources are high 
than when they are low. 
 
Resource-based rationale, based 
on the opportunity to develop 
sustainable competitive advan-
tage, plays a larger role in ex-
plaining firm boundaries when a 
firm has lower levels of recover-
able slack and a risk seeking 
orientation than when a firm has 
higher slack and risk averseness. 
 
4.2 Focus of the empirical studies remains limited to decision making and outcomes 
As argued before, two issues have been investigated in the empirical literature. First, the is-
sue of how certain variables affect the propensity to outsource and the firm-level degree of out-
sourcing. Second, the issue of how certain variables affect the performance of outsourcing arrange-
ments.11 Some scholars do not differ between the decision to outsource and the performance of the 
established arrangement. For instance, Smith, Mitra and Narasimhan (1998) investigate what makes 
                                                 
11 Some literature is also concerned with national differences in IT outsourcing practices; see Barthelemy and Geyer 
(2001), where the secondary focus is also on the IT outsourcing decision and the management of IT outsourcing opera-
tions, and Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2002) who focus on outsourcing practice differences between Europe and the US. 
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a firm decide to outsource by investigating the outcome of outsourcing arrangements. Although 
there are likely to be instances where the goals on which the decision to outsource is based, are 
achieved this cannot be considered the general case. The following assessment is shaped around the 
abovementioned two issues even though it is acknowledged that some studies do not fit into these 
categories. Despite overlaps in determinants of outsourcing decisions and investigated outcomes, 
each stream of studies centres on particular aspects of the determinants. While the theoretical foun-
dation for the two streams of empirical research under investigation is similar, outcome measures 
deployed vary substantially. 
 
Table 2: Independent Variables 
Independent Variable Definition / Measures Representative Authors 
(Comparative) produc-
tion cost 
a) Internalizing IT versus the price that has to be paid to 
vendor for the same IT services 
b) the cost of capital, labour and materials 
a) Ang & Straub (1998);  
b) Lacity and Willcocks 
(1995) 
Transaction costs a) refers to the effort, time, and costs incurred in search-
ing creating, negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing con-
tracts 
b) the costs of  monitoring, controlling and managing 
transactions 
c) encompass the costs of negotiating, monitoring, and 
enforcing contracts that arise directly from opportunistic 
behavior or from difficulties in measuring the goods or 
services being exchanged 
a) Ang & Straub (1998) 
b) Lacity and Willcocks 
(1995) 
c) Poppo & Zenger 
Measurement problems Accuracy in measuring asset values defines the effective-
ness of markets. When contributions from an outside 
supplier cannot be accurately assessed, adequate con-
tracts will be costly to craft 
Poppo & Zenger, 1998 
Perceived threat of op-
portunism 
The bounded rationality of management impedes their 
ability to distinguish firms that may behave opportunisti-
cally from those that may adopt a more cooperative 
stance. It is the threat of opportunism as perceived by 
management that lead to ex ante TC (contractual safe-
guards) and the recognition of possible ex post TC (con-
tract enforcement)  
Steensma & Corley (2002) 
Perceived threat of 
commercial failure 
The threat arises from uncertainty about the technology, 
about its design efficacy, and market acceptance 
Steensma & Corley (2002) 
Perceived opportunity 
for sustainable advan-
tage 
A firm has an advantage if it is able to create value in a 
way that other firms cannot. The advantage is sustainable 
if it continues to exist despite competitors’ efforts of du-
plicating it 
Steensma & Corley (2002) 
Bounded rationality A condition of human “frailty” associated with the com-
putational limits of humans. Although decision makers 
intend to act rationally, due to limitations in their infor-
mation processing and communication abilities, they 
demonstrate bounded rationality 
Kim & Miranda (2001) 
 
Transaction idiosyn-
crasy 
a) Investments in human and physical capital that cannot 
be redeployed without losing productive value. 
b) the degree to which the assets needed to perform the 
activity are not transferable to other activities 
c) enables firms to reduce production costs, innovate, and 
a) Robertson & Gatignon 
(1998) 
b) Wildener & Selto (1999) 
c) Poppo & Zenger 
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meet product specifications. However, it also damages 
the performance of simple market governance by creating 
hold-up hazards as the assets are of lesser value in alter-
native uses 
Behavioural uncertainty Reflects difficulties of monitoring contract performance 
and controlling the human tendency toward opportunism 
Wildener & Selto (1999) 
Technological uncer-
tainty 
a) Refers to the probability of improvements in technol-
ogy 
b) technological advances that dramatically changes the 
ways firms operation in ways completely unanticipated 
a) Robertson & Gatignon 
(1998) 
b) Poppo & Zenger (1998) 
Demand uncertainty Concerns the fluctuations and the unpredictability of de-
mand 
Robertson & Gatignon (1998) 
Sunk costs Any historical investment in a current “make” activity Roodhooft & Warlop (1999) 
Frequency The volume or rate at which activities are conducted Wildener & Selto (1999) 
Complexity of activity 
portfolio 
Degree of interpersonal complexity and requirements for 
firm-specific human capital 
Azoulay  (2002) 
Knowledge intensity Knowledge production requires that information and 
problem-solving capabilities be brought together  at a 
single locus 
Azoulay (2000) 
Peripheral activities Less strategically relevant activities. Identification relies 
on a firm’s individual judgement based on what it con-
siders its core competence  
Gilley & Rasheed (2000) 
Business Strategy Cost leadership or differentiation strategy Gilley & Rasheed (2000) 
Joint decision making of 
managers and IT 
Sponsorship of the decision. Sponsor defined as the per-
son who initiated or championed the sourcing decision 
and who made or authorised the final decision. Results 
from open ended question about sponsors.  
Lacity & Willcocks (1998) 
Competitive internal and 
external bidding 
The firm made the sourcing decision by creating a re-
quest-for-proposal and inviting external bids as well as 
bids from internal IT department 
Lacity & Willcocks (1998) 
 
 
4.2.1 Making outsourcing decisions 
The majority of studies on IT outsourcing concentrates on the outsourcing decision. Al-
though the make-or-buy decision is taken in two dimensions namely “breath”, meaning the amount 
of activities outsourced, and “depth”, denoting the relative value of the outsourced part of an activ-
ity compared with the part of the activity kept in-house, most empirical studies only examine the 
decision as binary decision. Traditionally, the literature has dealt much with transaction costs and 
the notions of “core” and “commodity” activities as the main constructs for making the outsourcing 
decision. Yet, the review of empirical studies reveals that other independent variables (see table 2) 
may affect the propensity to outsource IT. This is in accordance with recent research that empha-
sises that the traditional determinants of outsourcing decisions derived from both transaction cost 
theory and capability based view may be too narrow (Yang and Huang, 2000).  
From a transaction cost perspective several theoretical determinants of firm boundaries have 
been tested. Ang and Straub’s (1998) study of IS outsourcing in the US banking industry reports a 
negative relation between the transaction cost involved with hiring vendors (particularly searching 
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costs) and the degree of IT outsourcing.12 In terms of a transaction’s critical dimensions Wildener 
and Selto (1999) report that frequency of resource use is positively related to internalisation and 
Robertson and Gatignon (1998) find that the greater the technological uncertainty, the more likely 
that a firm uses alliances rather than internal governance for developing technology. They also con-
tend that asset specificity is likely to make a firm pursue technology development internally. Rood-
hooft and Warlop (1999) and Poppo and Zenger (1998) find that the anticipation of asset specific 
investment reduces the likelihood of outsourcing. Wildener and Selto (1999) likewise find strong 
support for the hypothesis that a firm internalise resources and attributes that require firm-specific 
investments. In addition, Steensma and Corley (2002) find a positive relationship between the per-
ceived threat of opportunism and the probability of internalisation. They do however, report that the 
transaction cost rationale based on the threat of opportunism better explains firm boundaries when 
management stockholdings are low than when they are high. A general support of transaction cost 
reasoning for making the outsourcing decision is evident from the abovementioned studies. 
Steensma and Corley (2002) conduct a test of capability-based arguments. They find that the 
opportunity to develop sustainable competitive advantage is more closely related to internalisation 
when a firm has lower levels of recoverable slack and a risk seeking orientation. Ang and Straub 
(1998) test the resource-based theory in a reverse fashion by examining the extent of outsourcing 
when an external firm has a comparative production advantage. They find a positive relation be-
tween the sizes of the comparative production cost advantage offered through IT outsourcing and 
the degree of IT outsourcing. Moreover, production costs play a much stronger role in the outsourc-
ing decision than transaction costs do. While the findings can be interpreted as a strong support for 
the emphasis on strategic perspectives in outsourcing decisions, they can also be regarded as evi-
dence of the weight of financial criteria.  
Other independent variables and their correlation with positive outsourcing decisions in-
clude the risk of failure, which was found to be negatively related to the probability of internalisa-
tion (Steensma and Corley, 2002), measurement costs, where increases in the difficulty of measur-
ing an innovation’s performance is positively related to internal governance (Robertson and Ga-
tignon, 1998), previous outsourcing success, which is positively related to outsourcing (Grover et 
al., 1996), and sunk costs, which Roodhooft and Warlop (1999) find reduce the likelihood of out-
sourcing although such past investments should be irrelevant. By using firm size as control variable 
Ang and Straub (1998) show that there is a strong relationship between firm size and outsourcing. 
                                                 
12 Interestingly, they also found that a firm’s sensitivity to fluctuations in financial slack could not explain sourcing de-
cisions. 
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Smaller firms have difficulties in generating economies of scale in their IT operations and are thus 
more likely to outsource these activities. In sum, it is possible to extract three broad conclusions 
from this stream of empirical studies: 
 
• Most studies have examined outsourcing decisions form a transaction cost perspective. 
Transaction cost rationales focusing on asset specificity as the explaining variable for mak-
ing outsourcing decisions receive general support in mainly stable and mature industries 
• Few studies have investigated the explanatory power of the capability-based view in terms 
of outsourcing decision-making. There is little consensus in the existing studies of the merits 
of capability-based rationales. 
• Several other variables than asset specificity and core competences affect the propensity to 
outsource, so that main theoretical explanations might be too limited to generate proposi-
tions that capture the drivers in outsourcing decisions. 
 
4.2.2   Outsourcing Outcomes 
The firm-level performance effects of IT outsourcing have been discussed widely in previ-
ous theoretical work. However, the current level of understanding of these outcomes is based pri-
marily on anecdotal evidence such as that provided by the competence-based view which suggests 
that a firm should continuously invest in those activities that constitute its core competence while 
outsourcing the rest (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Quinn, 1992). Little empirical research has exam-
ined the performance and competitive implications of firms’ governance decisions in general and 
sourcing strategies in particular (Leiblein et al., 2002). Nonetheless, developing sound sourcing 
strategies is seen as critical to improve performance in the recent literature. Yet, empirical tests re-
main ambiguous and show detrimental impact on performance. One should also notice that per-
formance is not an unambiguously defined measure in current outsourcing research (see table 3). 
Some studies focus on technology performance (Leiblien et al., 2002), some focus on financial and 
non-financial performance (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000), and others concentrate on different per-
formance measures. 
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Table 3: Dependent Variables 
Dependent Variable Definition / Measures Representative Authors 
Degree of IT outsourc-
ing 
Three perspectives: 1) operations: an omnibus measure of 
whether the firm is operating primarily through insourced 
or outsourced arrangements, 2) functional: respondents 
gauge the extent of outsourcing across 8 different IT 
functions, 3) applications: standard banking applications 
were presented to the respondents and they were asked to 
assess the extent to which these applications were out-
sourced 
Ang & Straub (1998) 
Outsourcing intensity Measured as a lower bound to the firms “true” level of 
adjustment through market-mediated employment ar-
rangements, which include (but are not restricted to) out-
sourcing. 
Azoulay (2000) 
Outsourcing expendi-
ture 
No definition Kim & Miranda (2001) 
Technological perform-
ance  
The performance effects of firms’ production sourcing 
strategies. More specifically, the technological perform-
ance implications of production internalization versus 
outsourcing by firms in the global semiconductor indus-
try. 
Leiblein, Reuer & Dalsace 
(2002) 
Outsourcing success Consists of 3 categories of benefits: 1) strategic: the abil-
ity of a firm to focus on its core business, outsource rou-
tine activities, 2) economic: the ability of a firm to utilize 
expertise and economies of scale in human and techno-
logical resources of the vendor and manage its cost struc-
ture, 3) technological: the ability of a firm to gain access 
to leading-edge IT and avoid technological obsolescence 
that result from changes 
Grover, Cheon & Teng (1996) 
Partnership quality 2 dimensions: 1) fitness of use: how well does the out-
come of a relationship match with expectations, 2) reli-
ability: partnership free from deficiencies.  
Five factors make up partnership quality: trust, business, 
understanding, benefit/risk sharing, conflict and com-
mitment 
Kim & Lee (1999) 
Exchange Performance Not only governance efficiency, but overall satisfaction 
with exchange performance (measured on 1-7 scale) 
Poppo & Zenger (2002) 
Cost savings “expected cost savings achieved” was adopted as the 
measure of success 
Lacity & Willcocks (1998) 
 
The focus of the studies concerned with the performance of IT outsourcing deals has been 
on discovering, which of the many independent variables are correlated with outsourcing success 
defined in various ways. However, other studies have focused on the content of the make-or-buy 
decision and its effect on performance. For example, Leiblein et al. (2002) examine whether gov-
ernance decisions, in particular outsourcing decisions, have any effect on technological perform-
ance. They observe that governance decisions per se do not significantly influence technology per-
formance. Instead they find that the relationship between governance choice and performance is de-
pendent on the distribution of relevant capabilities and the degree to which performance is driven 
by autonomous or systemic innovation as defined by Chesbrough and Teece (1996). Their second 
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main finding is that deviations from the optimal discriminating alignment might have detrimental 
affects on performance. This can be the case when contractual safeguards are inadequate for the 
specific situation. Lacity and Willcocks (1998) focuses on the degree of outsourcing and find that 
selective outsourcing decisions are more likely than total outsourcing decisions to achieve expected 
cost savings. 
The kind of activities outsourced may also affects outsourcing performance. Gilley and 
Rasheed (2000) proposed that outsourcing peripheral activities would have a positive effect on firm 
performance while outsourcing core activities would have negative effect. However, they found that 
there was no direct firm-level performance effect of outsourcing intensity. They also hypothesized 
that a firm’s business level strategy would moderate the relationship between outsourcing intensity 
and firm performance to find that cost leader and differentiation strategy change this picture. Their 
test showed that for both cost leaders and differentiators there was a positive correlation between 
peripheral and core outsourcing and performance (respectively financial and innovative perform-
ance). Finally, they proposed that environmental dynamism moderates the relationship between de-
cision and performance by enhancing the positive effects and neutralising the negative effects of 
outsourcing. The findings showed the contrary. Hence, firms operating in relatively stable environ-
ments have more to gain from outsourcing. They explain this by submitting that first, the potential 
transaction costs associated with negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing outsourcing arrangement 
may increase more in dynamic environments, and second, that the bargaining power of adequate 
suppliers may also be greater in these environments. In general, they conclude that firm-level bene-
fits of outsourcing may have been overstated in the past.   
From a relational perspective Kim and Lee (1999) find a positive relation between partner-
ship quality and outsourcing success. They propose a variety of variables to compose the notion of 
partnership quality including participation, joint action, communication quality, coordination, in-
formation sharing, age of relationship, mutual dependence, culture similarity and top management 
support. Their results however show that age of relationship and mutual dependence is detrimental 
to partnership quality and they do not find a positive relation between joint action, coordination, 
cultural similarity and partnership quality. Following this study Lee (2001) reports a positive rela-
tion between the degree of knowledge sharing and outsourcing success. In a similar vein Lacity and 
Willcocks (1998) report that senior executives and IT managers who made decisions together 
achieved expected cost savings with a higher frequency than when either stakeholder group acted 
alone. 
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Lacity and Willcocks (1998) examined contractual factors affecting the outcome of out-
sourcing arrangements. They found that the organization of the bidding process affect performance 
in away such that firms that invite internal and external bids achieved expected cost savings with 
higher frequency than those that only invited external bids. Moreover, their study revealed that con-
tract duration is negatively correlated with achieving cost savings and that detailed fee-for-service 
contracts achieved expected cost savings with a higher relative frequency than other types of fee-
for-service contracts. Poppo and Zenger (1998) report partial support for the view that increased 
difficulty in measuring the performance of an activity will negatively affect the performance of ex-
changes governed through the market, whereas they find clear support that increased difficulty in 
measuring the performance of an activity will negatively affect the performance of exchanges gov-
erned through firm organization. Yet, they do not find significant support for the view that increases 
in measuring difficulty increase the likelihood of vertical integration. 
 The results of the empirical studies regarding the performance of IT outsourcing arrange-
ments indicate a divergence between the current theoretical rationales and the observed outcomes. 
Again, several broad conclusions can be drawn: 
 
• Performance measures used vary substantially; objective performance measures fail to sup-
port that outsourcing increases performance. 
• There are no studies supporting the competence-based argument that outsourcing peripheral 
activities and retaining core activities in-house improves performance.13  
• Studies also fail to support knowledge-based arguments concerned with hierarchical benefits 
and associated performance effects. 
• Newer studies, which remain sparse, portray general support for the relational view: knowl-
edge sharing and partnership quality contributes positively to outsourcing performance. 
 
4.3. Future empirical research on IT outsourcing: What do need to know? 
 Whereas the previous section has assessed the current state of empirical outsourcing re-
search, the following sections offer avenues for future empirical research. 
 
4.3.1 Comparative empirical studies are needed 
                                                 
13 Azoulay (2002) shows that the productivity of internal teams increases with outsourcing, but he attributes the increase 
to employee commitment. 
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Empirical studies of IT outsourcing have been particularly informative regarding the out-
sourcing decision. In general, transaction cost theory has received support for its core argument, 
that asset specificity is the main determinant in internal production versus external procurement de-
cisions. Yet, firms in similar business environments and situations adopt different outsourcing 
strategies. Madhok (2002) notes: ”Clearly, the reason why there are variations in organizational 
form under similar transaction characteristics or, alternatively, why different firms organize similar 
transactions in different ways is that it is not just transaction particulars that matter, but also firm 
particulars”. Whereas the resource-based view concentrates on these “firm particulars” it has ne-
glected that firms can also exploit resources through market arrangements (Silverman, 1999). Still, 
the extent to which outsourcing arrangements generate value depends on the efficiency of both pro-
duction and exchange (Ricardo, 1962). Thus, more satisfying empirical studies are called for to ad-
dress not just the decision with respect to hierarchical governance or market governance, but also 
take into account how a firm’s IT-resources and capabilities can best be developed and deployed in 
the search for competitive advantage (Madhok, 2002; Combs and Ketchen, 1999). Since transaction 
cost scholars mainly focus on the role of efficient governance in explaining firms as an institution 
for organizing economic activity (Williamson, 1975; Klein et al. 1978) and competence-based 
scholars tends to emphasize the role of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991; 
Peteraf, 1993), is appears logical that the outsourcing decision should have been investigated com-
paratively from a transaction cost and from a competence-based researchers.  
Although some studies show that a specific theory has more effect in explaining certain ob-
servations than another, it is difficult to imagine one of the three theories not having some degree of 
explanatory power. Each perspective appears to provide complementary implications for the differ-
ent phases of the IT outsourcing process. Quinn and Hilmer (1994) utilize insights from both re-
source-based and transaction cost theory when they argue that the outcome of outsourcing decision 
depends on two dimensions: strategic importance and strategic vulnerability. However, even though 
the perspectives complement each other nicely their joint utilization in clarifying outsourcing ar-
rangements has been unsatisfactory in empirical studies. While the perspectives share important 
similarities, the focus on exchange dimensions and productive performance is different, and the 
relative importance of each needs to be addressed across outsourcing types and industry setting in 
cross-sectional studies. 14 
                                                 
14 To our knowledge there are only two studies addressing comparative testing of theories are Poppo and Zenger (1998, 
2002) and Steensma and Corley (2002). 
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4.3.2 Empirical research requires attention to contractual design 
Combining transaction cost arguments with resource-based and relational reasoning suggest 
that vendors need to balance the advantages of developing strong relationships with the costs of 
providing the vendor with bargaining power through relation-specific investments (as suggested by 
Hurst and Hanessian, 1995). The challenge lies in writing a contract that is specific enough to pro-
tect a firm from opportunism yet flexible enough to adjust to contingencies (Allen and 
Chandrasheklar, 2000). Even with the assumption that firms can both efficiently and effectively 
make IT outsourcing decisions and manage their IT outsourcing relationship, there are still severe 
contractual problems that must be addressed to ensure optimal outcomes from IT outsourcing ar-
rangements. The implication is that research needs to direct attention toward the contractual prac-
tices for supporting outsourcing decisions and relationships. There often exists a mismatch between 
the activity attributes and the contract features, which leads to costly outsourcing failure (Aubert et 
al., 1996). Although current empirical studies offer a variety of determinants of outsourcing deci-
sions and success to practitioners, current research on contractual support remains mainly a concep-
tual discussion. The results of the studies highlight the importance of evaluating a range of variables 
but give little guidance to which contractual factors might effect outsourcing outcome, how these 
contractual factors influence performance, or how firms can use contract alignment to ensure the 
desired outcome of a relationship? What we do know is that contracting appears to yield highest 
value when it combines the market advantages such as specialization, discipline and flexibility with 
hierarchy features such as routines and common language ensuring effective utilization and sharing 
of knowledge (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992) to form longer-term, coopera-
tive relationships.  
In terms of contractual elements, it is obvious that a contradiction exists between the trans-
action cost argument favoring detailed contracts specifying the obligation of each party and the al-
location of costs and benefits in every conceivable state of nature and alternatively the relational 
view’s argument, that the parties should rely on social and sequential contracts and approach prob-
lems as they go along. The problems with each solution are respectively bounded rationality and 
opportunism (Aubert et al., 1996). Although the arguments from both perspectives are clear and ap-
preciable, they also contribute to growing confusion. It is apparent that neither fully specified nor 
completely socially based contracts are efficient. An empirical question is how to strike a balance? 
This is a very important issue to be addressed in empirical research since contractual decisions have 
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widespread impact. A complication emerges, however, because of increased complexity of IT out-
sourcing deals results in new implications for contract terms. Traditionally firms outsourced non-
core activities and accordingly used transaction-based approaches in contracting. Today, outsourc-
ing contracts are less defined ex ante (Yost and Harmon, 2002) and tend to be more relationship 
based. A second complication of such empirical research is that firms make contractual commit-
ments that affect the portfolio of future options available and thus contractual governance decisions 
evolve in a path dependent manner (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999). For example, prior contractual 
decisions potentially influence both the future outsourcing decisions. While many scholars have 
brought forth normative statements such as “a company’s overarching objective should be to maxi-
mise flexibility and control” (Lacity, Willcocks and Feeny, 1995: p. 84), few have sought to outline 
the contractual implications of such statements, and supported them through empirical corrobora-
tion. 
 
4.3.3. The outsourcing process needs to be addressed in its entirety 
The model presented in figure 1 portrays the IT outsourcing process illustrates the various 
phases that can be investigated. Although some of the phases have been studied, shortcomings in 
addressing the entirety of the outsourcing process across all phases present future research opportu-
nities. The first pathway for future research should aim at developing a better understanding of the 
complementarities of the current theories used in empirical outsourcing studies. Various interrela-
tions between the theories and their individual contributions to understanding the different phases in 
the IT outsourcing process provide for interesting research opportunities. While there is vast re-
search that investigates boundary choices from each the three perspectives, there is little literature 
that offers an integrated approach. To develop an appropriate framework for business managers 
considering IT outsourcing processes, the strands in the literature must be integrated in a process 
model. Second, current research has focused on the IT outsourcing decision and the IT outsourcing 
management as illustrated by the choice of dependent variable in the two categories of empirical 
studies. By simplifying the IT outsourcing process to merely include a decision and a management 
phase it can be tempting to conclude that this focus is comprehensive. However, by acknowledging 
that this is an unsatisfactory simplification one notices that the contractual phase has been largely 
neglected. Questions such as how do we best support the desired relation, what are the effects of 
different contractual governance structures and the relationship and its performance, and which con-
tractual factors affect the transformation process and performance and how are short of answers. 
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Answers to such questions may assist as a remedy for the continuation of a vast amount of reported 
IT outsourcing failures and mistakes as well as lacking understanding in the empirical literature. In 
addition, an understanding of how the different choices in an IT outsourcing process are interrelated 
is clearly lacking.  
Obviously, firms outsourcing activities with low strategic impact for achieving cost-savings 
do not have to manage the relationship as rigorously as firms outsourcing high strategic impact ac-
tivities for ensuring continuous innovation. What is less obvious and lacks empirical investigation is 
how the decision motive and the relationship management is connected to contractual elements such 
as performance metrics, performance monitoring, contract duration, risk allocation, allocation of 
managerial control, payment systems and fee structures, incentive alignment, asset ownership, etc. 
Third, combining the two suggested research areas above allows for a promising multi-theoretical 
examination of contractual support mechanisms as well as their impact on different phases in the 
outsourcing process. Further research within the proposed areas will be beneficial to both research-
ers and practitioners who face IT outsourcing queries. 
 
5. Discussion: Advancing empirical research on IT-outsourcing 
Disagreement and confusion about the definition of outsourcing are still widespread. Loh 
and Venkatraman defined outsourcing as “the significant contribution by external vendors in the 
physical and/or human resources associated with the entire or specific components of the IT infra-
structure in the user organization” (1992: 9). Alternatively, outsourcing has been defined as “prod-
ucts supplied to the multinational firm by independent suppliers from around the world” and “the 
extent of components and finished products supplied to the firm by independent suppliers” (Kotabe, 
1992: 103). Roodhoft and Warlop (1999) argue that in practice outsourcing is not a make-or-buy 
decision, but involves a switch from internal production to external procurement. In addition, out-
sourcing has been defined as “the reliance on external sources for manufacturing components and 
other value-adding activities” (Lei and Hitt, 1995: 836). Gilley and Rasheed (2000) propose a defi-
nition that acknowledging the different definitions as complements rather than substitutes. They 
suggest that outsourcing may arise first, through the substitution of external purchases for internal 
activities, i.e. a discontinuation of internal production and an initiation of procurement from outside 
suppliers, and second through abstention, i.e. when a firm purchases goods or services from outside 
organizations even when those goods or services have not been completed in-house in the past. Cur-
rent theoretical strands of literature focus empirical research on some process phase while blind-
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spotting others. The following table summarizes what we regard as promising questions to be ad-
dressed in future empirical research on IT outsourcing processes: 
 
Table 4: Avenues for future research 
 The IT outsourcing process 
 
Phases  
              
Theories 
Outsourcing decision:  Vendor selection: Contract design:  Relationship management 
and performance evalua-
tion:  
(A)  
Transac-
tion Cost 
Theory 
Are external transaction costs 
higher than internal transaction 
costs? 
 
How do outsourcing strategies 
vary across market conditions 
in markets for alternative out-
sourcing types where knowl-
edge gaps between the parties 
differ in degree? 
 
Does working with 
several suppliers 
decrease or increase 
transaction costs?  
 
Do multiple vendor 
strategies help hedg-
ing outsourcing risk? 
If yes, to what de-
gree? 
 
Do highly specified 
contracts reduce or 
increase vendor oppor-
tunism? 
 
Should risks and reward 
be allocated differently 
in different types of 
outsourcing arrange-
ments? 
Do transaction costs of 
search; bargaining; monitor-
ing and control decrease as 
relationship proceeds over 
time? 
 
Can credible commitments 
enable firms to balance con-
flicts between the desire to 
learn from vendors and at-
tempts to mitigate hazards 
associated with opportunistic 
behavior by the same par-
ties? 
(B)  
Capability-
Based 
View 
Compare production cost ad-
vantage among suppliers and 
internal procurement? 
 
Does IT outsourcing a) free 
resources in the firm, and b) are 
these resources capable of be-
ing redeployed in more produc-
tive uses?  
Does a multiple 
source strategy pre-
vent lock in to infe-
rior technological 
capabilities? 
 
Do high degrees of 
IT outsourcing de-
crease capabilities to 
an extent so as to 
compromise IT pur-
chase? 
 
Should the contract 
include cost-plus or 
fixed service fees? 
 
In each case, what is the 
impact on supplier’s 
incentive for production 
cost reduction? 
 
What is the impact of 
alternative contractual 
design on performance? 
 
Does relational absorptive 
capacity increase to ease 
interface specification and 
interaction efficiency? 
 
How are performance meas-
ures of outsourcing relations 
affected by breath and de-
gree of outsourcing? 
 
Do alternative types of out-
sourcing require alternative 
relational capabilities? 
(C)  
Relational 
Perspective  
Evaluate whether vendors are 
willing (partnership risk) and 
capable (performance risk) of 
delivering what you want? 
 
To what extent are outsourcing 
benefits dependent on network 
embededness of the vendor?  
Is there a trade-off 
between the number 
of relationships and 
the relationship 
depths/value? 
 
How to construct the 
optimal portfolio of 
relationships?  
Does high specification 
of contracts increase or 
decrease strategic risks? 
 
Is it possible to design a 
contract offering the 
incentive of the market 
and the control of the 
hierarchy? 
 
Does repeated outsourcer-
vendor interaction increase 
the vendor’s ability and will-
ingness to deliver the de-
sired? 
 
Does repeated outsourcer-
vendor interaction increase 
the firm’s ability to adapt to 
technological advance? 
(D) 
 Multi 
theoretical 
perspective 
What are the implications of 
the explicit purpose of out-
sourcing - be it cost reduction, 
additional revenue, learning- 
and development options – for 
the different phases in the out-
sourcing process? 
 
Across industry settings and 
outsourcing types, to what de-
gree do comparative production 
cost advantages or transaction 
cost consideration impact out-
sourcing decisions? 
What are the eco-
nomic and strategic 
effects of having 
multiple vendors 
responsible for one 
activity, having mul-
tiple vendors each 
responsible for dif-
ferent activities or 
having a single ven-
dor responsible for 
all activities? 
How does the specifica-
tion degree of contracts 
affect the cost and bene-
fits of different IT out-
sourcing arrangements? 
 
What are the most 
important determinants 
of outsourcing perform-
ance; e.g. contract 
length – flexibility ver-
sus commitment? 
  
 
Do alternative theoretical 
frameworks apply to alterna-
tive forms of IT outsourcing? 
 
Is there a trade-off between 
efficiency and learning in 
managing IT outsourcing 
relationships? 
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6. Conclusions 
The empirical outsourcing literature is largely confined to qualitative evidence. Our review 
revealed three theoretical perspectives that have been most widely tested empirically: (a) transaction 
cost economics; (b) capability based view; (c) and most recently the relational view. They delineate 
distinct yet complementary aspects of the implications surrounding outsourcing arrangements. Yet, 
each theoretical perspective provides ample scope for further empirical examination. To this end we 
outline most pressing research needs and research opportunities. In addition, the arguments pre-
sented here convey the message that more empirical studies are needed addressing the outsourcing 
process in its entirety from multiple theoretical perspectives. While the path provided for future re-
search may be suggestive rather than definitive it serves to cast light on several issues of interaction, 
contradiction, and complementarities between theoretical perspectives that serve to stimulate em-
pirical research on IT-outsourcing. The article attempted to take the first step for more comprehen-
sive empirical research agenda on the entirety of the outsourcing process. Research strategies identi-
fied will aid to fill the gap between what we claim to know (theoretically) and what we know (em-
pirically). 
 
 32
 
References 
 
Allen, S. and Chandrashekar, A. (2000). Outsourcing services: The contract is just the beginning, Business Horizons, 
March-April. 
Ang, S. and Straub, D. (1998). Production and transaction economies and IS outsourcing: A study of the US banking 
industry, MIS Quarterly, December, pp. 535-552. 
Argyres, N. and Liebeskind, J. P. (1999). Contractual commitments, bargaining power and governance inseparability: 
Incorporating history into transaction cost theory, Academy of Management Review, 24, 1, pp. 49-63. 
Arnett, K. P. and Jones, M. C. (1994). Firms that choose outsourcing: A profile, Information & Management, 26, pp. 
179-188 
Aubert, B., Rivard, S. and Patry, M. (1996). A transaction cost approach to outsourcing behaviour: Some empirical evi-
dence, Information & Management, 30, pp. 51-64. 
Azoulay, P. (2000). The many faces of outsourcing: Adjustment costs, transaction costs, and governance spillovers, 
Mimemo, Colombia University. 
Azoulay, P. (2002). Outsourcing as commitment to insiders: Evidence from drug development. Mimemo, Colombia 
University. 
Baden-Fuller, C., Targett, D. and Hunt, B. (2000). Outsourcing to outmanoeuvre: Outsourcing re-defines competitive 
strategy and structure, European Management Journal, 18, 3, pp. 285-295. 
Bakos, J. Y. and Brynjolfsson, E. (1993). Information technology, incentives, and the optimal number of suppliers, 
Journal of Management Information Systems, 10, 2, pp. 37-53. 
Barney, J. (1986). Strategic Factor Markets: Expectations, Luck and Business Strategy, Management Science, Vol. 32, 
Issue 10, pp. 1231-41. 
Barney, J. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage, Journal of Management, 17, 1, pp. 99-120. 
Barthelemy, J. and Geyer, D. (2001). IT outsourcing: Evidence from France and Germany, European Management 
Journal, 19, 2, pp. 195-202. 
Chandler, A. (1977). The visible hand – The managerial revolution in American business, Belknap Press, Cambridge, 
Mass.  
Chandler, A. (1990). Scale and scope – The dynamics of industrial capitalism, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Chesbrough, H. and Teece, D. (1996). When is virtual virtuous? Organizing for innvation,  Harvard Business review, 
January-February, pp. 65-73. 
Coase, R. (1937). The Nature of the Firm, Economica, 4, pp. 386-405.  
Cohen, W. M. and Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and innovation, Admin-
istrative Science Quarterly, 35, pp. 128-152. 
Combs, J. and Ketchen, D. (1999). Explaining interfirm cooperation and performance: Toward a reconciliation of pre-
dictions from the resource-based view and organizational economics, Strategic Management Journal, 20, pp. 867-
888. 
Conner, K. (1991). A historical comparison of resource-based theory and five schools of thought within industrial or-
ganization economics: Do we have a new theory of the firm?, Journal of Management, 17, pp. 121-154. 
Conner, K. and Prahalad, C. (1996). A Resource-Based Theory of the Firm: Knowledge versus Opportunism, Organiza-
tion Science, Vol. 7, Issue 5, pp. 477-501. 
D’Aveni, R. and Ravenscraft, D. (1994). Economies of integration versus bureaucracy costs: Does vertical integration 
improve performance?, Academy of Management Journal, 37, 5, pp. 1167-1206. 
Dierickx, I. and Cool, K. (1989). Asset stock Accumulation and Sustainability of Competitive Advantage, Management 
Science, 35, pp. 1504-1511. 
DiRomualdo, A. and Gurbaxani, V. (1998). Strategic intent for IT outsourcing, Sloan Management Review, Summer, 
pp. 67-80. 
Domberger, S. (1998). The contracting organization – a guide to strategic outsourcing, Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford, UK. 
Dyer, J, Kale, P. and Singh, H. (2001). How to make strategic alliances work, MIT Sloan Management Review, Sum-
mer, pp. 37-44. 
Dyer, J. and Singh, H. (1998). The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of interorganizational competitive 
advantage, Academy of Management Review, 23, 4, pp. 660-679. 
Earl, M. (1996). The risks of outsourcing IS, Sloan Management Review, no. 37, Spring, pp. 26-32. 
Fixler, D. and Siegel, D. (1999). Outsourcing and productivity growth in services, Structural Change and Economic 
Dynamics, 10, pp. 177-194. 
 33
Ghoshal, S. and Moran, P. (1996). Bad for practice: A critique of the transaction cost theory, Academy of Management 
review, 21, 1, pp. 13-47. 
Gilley, M. and Rasheed, A. (2000). Making more by doing less: An analysis of outsourcing and its effects on firm per-
formance, Journal of Management, 26, 4, pp. 763-790. 
Grover, V., Cheon, M. J. and Teng, J. (1996). The effects of service quality and partnership on the outsourcing of in-
formation systems functions, Journal of Management of Information Systems, 12, 4, pp. 89-116. 
Gulati, R., Nohria, N. and Zaheer, A. (2000). Strategic networks, Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp. 203-215. 
Hitt, M., Dacin, M. T., Levitas, E., Arregle, J-L. and Borza, A. (2000). Partner selection in emerging and developed 
market contexts: Resource-based and organizational learning perspectives, Academy of Management Journal, 43, 
pp. 449-467. 
Hurst, I. and Hanessian, B. (1995). Navigating IT channels: Integrate or outsource?, McKinsey Quarterly, 3, pp. 103-
112. 
IDC/ International Data Corporation, European Outsourcing Markets and Trends, 1995-2001, London, UK, 1998. 
Insinga, R. (2000). Linking outsourcing to business strategy, Academy of Management Executive, 14, 4, pp. 58-70. 
Jones, C., Hesterly, W., Fladmoe-Lindquist, K. and Borgatti, S. (1998). Professional services constellations: How 
strategies and capabilities influence collaborative stability and change, Organization Science, 9, 3, pp. 396-410. 
Kakabadse, A. and Kakabadse, N. (2002). Trends in outsourcing: Contrasting US and Europe, European Management 
Journal, 20, 2, pp. 189-198. 
Kern, T. Willcocks, L. and Heck, E. (2002). The winner’s curse in IT outsourcing: strategies for avoiding relational 
trauma, California Management Review, 44, 2, pp. 47-69. 
Kim,Y-M. and Miranda, S. (2001). Safeguard mechanisms for information systems outsourcing under bounded rational-
ity, Working Paper. 
Klein, B., Crawford, R. G. and Alchian, A. (1978). Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive con-
tracting process, Journal of Law and Economics, 21, pp. 297-326. 
Kogut, B. and Zander, U. (1992). Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the replication of technology, 
Organization Science, 3, pp. 383-397. 
Lacity, M. and Willcocks, L. (1995). Interpreting technology sourcing decisions from a transaction cost perspective: 
Findings and critique, Accounting, Management and Information Technologies, 5, ¾, pp. 203-244. 
Lacity, M. and Willcocks, L. (1998). An empirical investigation of information technology sourcing practices: Lessons 
from experience, MIS Quarterly, September, pp. 363-409. 
Lacity, M., Willcocks, L. and Feeny, D. (1995). IT outsourcing: Maximize flexibility and control, Harvard Business 
Review, May-June. 
Langlois, R. (2001). The vanishing hand: The changing dynamics of industrial organization, Unpublished. 
Lee, J-N. (2001). The impact of knowledge sharing, organizational capability and partnership quality on IS outsourcing 
success, Information & Management, 38, pp. 323-335. 
Lee, J-N. and Kim, Y-G. (1999). Effects of partnership quality on IS outsourcing success: conceptual framework and 
empirical evidence, Journal of Management Information Systems, Spring, 15, 4, pp. 29-61. 
Leiblein, M., Reuer, J. and Dalsace, F. (2002). Do male or buy decisions matter? The influence of organizational gov-
ernance on technological performance, Strategic Management Journal, 23, pp. 817-833. 
Leonard-Barton, D. (1992). Core capabilities and core rigidities: A paradox in managing new product development, 
Strategic Management Journal, Summer Special Issue, 13, pp. 111–125.  
Loh, L. and Venkatraman, N (1992). Determinants of information technology outsourcing: A cross-sectional analysis, 
Journal of Management Information Systems, 9, 1, pp. 7-25. 
Madhok, A. (2002). Reassessing the Fundamentals and Beyond:  Ronald Coase, the Transaction Cost and Resource-
Based Theories of the Firm and the Institutional Structure of production, Strategic Management Journal, 23, pp. 
535-550. 
Mahnke, V. (2001). The process of vertical dis-integration: An evolutionary perspective on outsourcing. Journal of 
Management and Governance 5, pp. 353-379 
March, J. G. (1991) Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization Science, 2, pp. 71-87. 
Ngwenyana, O. and Brynson, N. (1999). Making the information systems outsourcing decision: A transaction cost ap-
proach to analyzing outsourcing decision problems, European Journal of Operational Research, 115, pp. 351-367. 
Overby and Mahnke (forthcoming 2003). Strategic Outsourcing – A managerial guideline. Thompson Publisher 
Parkhe, A. 1993. Strategic alliance structuring: A game theoretic and transaction cost examination of interfirm coopera-
tion. Academy of Management Journal, 36: 794-829.  
Peteraf, M. (1993). The Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage: A Resource-Based View, Strategic Management 
Journal, 14, 3, pp.179-191. 
 34
Poppo, L. and Zenger, T. (1998). Testing alternative theories of the firm: Transaction cost, knowledge-based, and 
measurement explanations for make-or-buy decisions in information services, Strategic Management Journal, 19, 
pp. 853-877. 
Poppo, L. and Zenger, T. (2002). Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or comple-
ments?, Strategic Management Journal, 23, pp. 707-725. 
Prahalad, C. K. and Hamel, G. (1990). The core competence of the corporation, Harvard Business Review, May-June, 
pp. 79-91. 
Quinn, J. B. and Hilmer, F. (1994). Strategic outsourcing, Sloan Management Review, 35, 4, pp. 43-66. 
Robertson, T. S. and Gatignon, H. (1998). Technology development mode: A transaction cost conceptualization, Strate-
gic Management Journal, 19, pp. 515-531. 
Roodhooft, F. and Warlop, L. (1999). On the role of sunk costs and asset specificity in outsourcing decisions: a research 
note, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 24, pp. 363-369. 
Roy, V. and Aubert, B. (2002). A resource-based analysis of IT sourcing, Database for Advances in Information Sys-
tems Spring, pp. 29-40. 
Rumelt, R. P. (1984). Toward a strategic theory of the firm, in Lamb, R. eds. Competitive Strategic Management, Pren-
tice Hall, Englewoods Cliffs, pp. 556-570. 
Rumelt, R. P., Schendel, D. and Teece, D. (1994). Strategic management and economics, Strategic Management Jour-
nal, 12, pp. 5-29. 
Sambamurthy, V. and Zmud, R. (2000). Research commentary: The organizing logic for an enterprise’s IT activities in 
the digital era – a prognosis of practice and a call for research, Information Systems Research, 11, 2, pp. 105-114. 
Silverman, B. (1999). Technological resources and the direction of corporate diversification: Toward an integration of 
the resource-based view and transaction cost economics, Management Science, 45, 8, pp. 1109-1124. 
Smith, M. A., Mitra, S. and Narasimhan, S. (1998). Information systems outsourcing: A study of pre-event firm charac-
teristics, Journal of Management of Information Systems, 15, 2, pp. 61-93. 
Steensma, H. and Corley, K. (2002). Organizational context as a moderator of theories on firm boundaries for technol-
ogy sourcing, Academy of Management Journal, 44, 2, pp. 271-291. 
Takeishi, A. (2001). Bridging inter- and intra-firm boundaries: Management of supplier involvement in automobile 
product development, Strategic Management Journal, 22, pp. 403-433. 
Veugelers, R. and Cassiman, B. (1999). Make and buy in innovation strategies: Evidence from Belgian manufacturing 
firms, Research Policy, 28, pp. 63-80. 
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A resource-based view of the firm, Strategic Management Journal, 5, 2, pp. 171-180. 
Wildener, S. K. and Selto, F. H. (1999). Management control systems and boundaries of the firm: Why do firms out-
source internal auditing activities?, Journal of Management Accounting Research, 11, pp.45-73. 
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies. New York, Free Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1979): Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, Journal of Law and 
Economics. 
Williamson, O. E. (1983). Credible commitments: Using hostages to support exchange, The American Economic Re-
view, 73, 4, pp. 519-540. 
Williamson, O. E. (1991). Strategizing, Economizing, and Economic Organization, Strategic Management Journal, 12, 
pp.75-94. 
Yang, C. and Huang, J.-B. (2000). A decision model for IS outsourcing, International Journal of Information Manage-
ment, 20, pp. 225-239. 
Yost, J. and Harmon, W. (2002). Contracting for information system outsourcing with multiple bidders, Journal of In-
formation Systems, 16, 1, pp. 49-59. 
Zenger, T. R. and Hesterly, W. S. (1997). The disaggregation of corporations: Selective Intervention, high-powered 
incentives, and molecular units, Organization Science, 8, 3, pp. 209-222. 
